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One of the traditional ways of thinking about the social responsibilities
of corporations starts from the premise that corporations are citizens of
our society and, like other citizens, they have an obligation to act mor-
ally. I want to talk about a different way of thinking about corporations
that I think, offers an alternative vision. I think it gets us to the same
place but I think it gets us there in a way that may be a little easier to as-
sign accountability. In using the kind of language that talks about corpo-
rations as moral actors, we tap into an old debate about the nature of
corporations and we come down squarely on the side of the entity view
which conceives of a corporation as a real person and not simply a legal
fictional construct. I am not going to get into that debate because I don't
think we can resolve it. It does make me uncomfortable to talk this way,
however, because corporations don't weep; they are not human actors. I
think it makes it harder to understand or think about who are the ones,
or who are the human persons, who are accountable in this enterprise. I
am more of a contractarian myself, and I laugh when I hear myself say
that because I am always arguing with the contractarians, but I am sym-
pathetic to some of the ways they approach the problems.
I tend to think that the best way to understand corporations is that
they are legal devices through which a group of people, a group of indi-
vidual human beings, contract among themselves in order to undertake
some kind of productive activity. In this process, the people involved are
acting together as a team. That does not make the team a person-we
cannot think of the team being some sort of entity, but the team meta-
phor should be contrasted with the standard contractarian way of think-
ing about corporations. The standard contractarian way says that corpo-
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rations are holding devices for property and that that property in some
sense belongs to the shareholders, and that in this view, shareholders
own the property collectively, and manage it by hiring or contracting
with managers. The managers are authorized to make decisions for the
group of "owners" as a whole, by acting through the central contracting
entity-the corporation. Under this theory, managers and directors are
viewed as agents of shareholders and they are required to act on their
behalf. The central contracting problem of corporate law is an agency
problem-between shareholders who are the owners of the property, and
are officers and directors who are their agents. Under this view, which is
the standard contractarian view of corporations, corporations have no
other social purpose other than profits for shareholders. Although they
must achieve that through lawful means, there is no point in even talking
about any other purpose for these holding devices for property. That is
the standard contractarian story and it is one that has really dominated
legal thinking in the last fifteen years.
Some of you may not be familiar with my work, but in a number of dif-
ferent things I have written in the past four to five years, I reject this ver-
sion and I reject it because it fails to take adequate account of the contri-
butions that are made to the productive activity that is going on in the
corporation by those who contribute human capital. A large and grow-
ing share of the wealth that is created by corporations in this country
comes from things like intellectual capital, idea capital, organizational
capital, and all kinds of intangible assets. We do not really understand
very well what these assets are, but we have good reasons to believe that
they consist of things that are embodied in the employees, their knowl-
edge, their skills, and their relationships to each other. We can be pretty
sure that this stuff gets on the elevator at night and goes down and walks
out the door and gets in the car and goes home and it is not really appro-
priate to talk about shareholders owning these assets.
So let me give you an alternative contractarian story about what a cor-
poration is and what corporation law achieves. This is based on some
work that I have done jointly with Professor Lynn Stout at the George-
town law school and that offers an alternative way that we can under-
stand this thing we call a corporation. This alternative view is contrac-
tarian in spirit but that gets us to where we want to go, which is to talk
about who are the human beings involved in this. Lynn and I argue that
a corporation is a legal device by which all of the participants in the en-
terprise act collectively, especially those who contribute human capital,
and those who contribute financial capital. These are the key players, al-
though I can make an argument on a case by case basis for why we
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should include some other players, some community interests or the in-
terest of suppliers or customers and that sort of thing, but in general I
think the key players are those who contribute financial capital and those
who contribute human capital. They enter into a mutual contract or
agreement, the essence of which is that they give up property rights over
both the inputs that are used in production and over the outputs from
production. They yield the property rights to a separate legal entity con-
trolled by an independent board of directors which has a legal responsi-
bility to act for the corporation and fiduciary duties running to the corpo-
ration and its members.
Now, the central contracting problem that is addressed by this device
by which everybody gives up property rights is not a principle agent
problem. This particular solution generates some principle-agent prob-
lems, and I don't want to suggest that the principle-agent problems are
not important. But the principal-agent problems are not the problem
that the corporation was set up to solve in the first place. Rather, the
contracting problem that is addressed by the formation of a corporation
is a team production problem. OK, what's a team production problem?
This is where I put on my economist hat now and introduce a different
body of theory. Team production arises in situations in which the output
of some productive enterprise is a joint function of the combined inputs
and coordinated efforts of a number of different individuals, and impor-
tantly, it is not possible to separate the output into the parts that are at-
tributable to each of the inputs. You cannot say this person did this part
of it and so they get this part of the output, and that person did that part
of it and so they get that part of the output. Outputs are a joint function
and you cannot specify who did what and who is responsible for what.
The other aspect of team production is that the inputs are complex and
specialized and very difficult to specify in advance. They are difficult to
monitor and difficult to evaluate. One way to think about these kinds of
inputs is that they are a type of enterprise-specific investment made by
the participants; they may be in time, energy, or ideas contributed by the
input provider. They are enterprise-specific in the sense that they are
custom designed for this particular enterprise. Possibly another sense in
which they may be enterprise-specific is that their value depends on
comparable investments being made by others in the joint enterprise, so
it is a collective activity. Production processes of this type are pervasive
in the economy, but they present at least three different difficulties in
contracting. First, you cannot write an ex ante contract specifying what
each input provider is to do and if you tried you would have a great deal
of difficulty evaluating whether the input provider actually did what they
1998]
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were suppose to do. So contracting ex ante, over inputs, is very difficult.
You could write an ex ante contract specifying in advance that each input
provider would get some pro rata share of the output. You could say
everyone gets 11n, if there are n participants everybody gets a 1/n share
of the output, but if you do that your contract would then be frought with
free rider problems because each input provider would have an incentive
to shirk. Each one gets /n of the output no matter what they do, be-
cause it is in the contract. Since the inputs are by assumption difficult to
monitor, there is not a good mechanism for trying to detect and punish
such shirking. On the other hand, if you do not write an ex ante contract
specifying what the payouts are going to be before you start the enter-
prise, you will probably find, when you get the output, when it is time to
divide it up, that the economic surplus that you have generated by this
team production process gets eaten up in ex post rent-seeking behavior,
or, to use more ordinary language, in fighting over who gets what piece
of the pie.
Now, interestingly, economists have not really studied team production
problems in very much depth. There are a few scholars who have
worked on it and have thought about what this means. I think it is a very
understudied area, but those who have studied team production prob-
lems have proposed three possible solutions. One is letting one team
member be the owner. Then, that team member hires all the others, pays
them according to their external opportunity costs, and pockets the re-
sidual. This solution ensures that the owner has adequate incentives to
exert effort in order to do what they can, at least in terms of monitoring.
It also ensures that the owner has the necessary incentives to make en-
terprise specific investments and this is probably what we see in entre-
preneurial firms. That is, individual owners hiring other people to work
for them. But if one party is the owner, and that one party is capturing
all the rents, the other participants may lose their incentives to make
these firm-specific kinds of investments. The second solution that has
been proposed in the economic literature is an elegant mathematical so-
lution. But if you are not an economist, you read it and you just scratch
your head because it is very clever mathematically, but it doesn't seem to
explain anything that sounds real to me. The solution is to write a con-
tingent contract that says everyone gets 1/n of the total output, but only if
the total output reaches some specified hurdle level, and that can only be
reached if everyone exerts effort. In effect, the solution works by pun-
ishing everyone if anyone shirks.
Now, a contract like that would be extremely difficult to write in prac-
tice because there is probably no way to know in most situations how
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high the hurdle would have to be in order to make sure that nobody
shirks. It also creates really perverse incentive problems because sup-
pose that one person shirks and the output falls short of the hurdle level
and you still have a surplus. What do you do with it? You have a surplus
that has been created, but if you pay it out to any of the team members
then you are back into the ex ante and ex post contracting problem and
you do not have a believable contract that really punishes everybody if
anybody shirks. The author of that solution proposes in his paper that
you need an outsider to the enterprise who becomes the recipient of the
less-than-hurdle-level surpluses, a sort of passive recipient. The paper
proposed that this is what shareholders do. But this is an extremely per-
verse notion of the role shareholders play. One problem with this solu-
tion is that if this outsider can exercise any influence over the team
members, they have an incentive to come in and bribe a team member to
shirk so that the output will fall short of the hurdle level and then the ex-
ternal party gets the surplus. So this strikes me as one of those clever
mathematical solutions that is completely ridiculous in practice.
Now, a third solution has appeared very recently in the economic lit-
erature and it is one that will sound very familiar to you when you hear
it. It is one of these sort of common sense things that has been going on
all along and we just never thought about it. This is in a paper written by
a couple of University of Chicago economists. This is the idea of third
party arbitration. The specific solution is for team members to give up
property rights over the joint enterprise to an external party who is not a
member of the team. They yield property rights to some person who
does not provide any critical enterprise-specific input. Giving up prop-
erty rights to this external party helps team members to solve their own
collective action problem because by giving up property rights over the
input and over the output each team member in effect is able to make a
credible commitment not to use their property rights to try to expropri-
ate rents from the other members of the team. They do not own it, they
cannot exercise undue influence and take the rents away from anybody
else. The external party to whom all of the team members give up prop-
erty rights, Lynn Stout and I argued, is not the shareholders; it is the cor-
poration itself. It is a truly brilliant solution! An inherently passive en-
tity that cannot come in and start trying to influence people to get them
to give up, to get them shirk so that there is a surplus leftover. The con-
trol rights over collective property is vested in an independent board of
directors.
Is this a flawless solution to the contracting problem I am talking
about? Of course not. It is a solution that leads to agency problems of
19981
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the type that have been studied endlessly by law and economics scholars
in recent years. But what has been missing in the analysis of the agency
problems in corporations is a credible explanation of why you would set
this thing up in the first place if it creates so many agency problems.
Why don't entrepreneurs and investors choose a different organizational
form that would give investors much tighter control over managers? We
think the answer is that the team production problem is actually ex-
tremely important and quite pervasive in the economy, and it is the giv-
ing up of property rights and control rights to a separate legal entity gov-
erned by an independent board of directors that provides a workable
solution to that problem. The team production analysis provides a con-
tractarian rationale for the view that corporations have a larger social
purpose than just profits, but I do not have to anthropomorphize corpo-
rations to get there. I don't have to argue that the corporation itself has
social responsibilities. Instead, I suggest that the social purpose of cor-
porations is to provide a mechanism through which groups of individuals
can pool their efforts and their resources in order to undertake some en-
terprise that they hope will be productive and will increase their collec-
tive welfare. But in this view, the board of directors plays an absolutely
critical role. It is they who must ultimately act for the corporation-for the
team. It is they who bear ultimate responsibility for decisions that deter-
mine the allocation of costs and risks and returns among all the team
members. And as moral beings, individual board members have the same
responsibility for personal moral behavior as any other human being. But
they have an additional responsibility when they act for the team to
make decisions that are fair and just. This is their job, this is what they
are there for. To use two old fashioned words, fairness and justice, two
old fashioned words that are not particularly popular in the jurispru-
dence of law and economics but nonetheless, when one understands this
conception of the corporation, become quite important. These decisions
must not only be fair and just, they must be well considered and not self-
serving. In other words, directors have fiduciary responsibilities to the
team as a whole as well as to individual members of the team. Our hy-
pothesis about the social corporations suggest that an important eco-
nomic function is served by arrangements that help keep boards of direc-
tors independent of all corporate constituencies, including shareholders.
They have to be free to make decisions that balance the interest of the
various constituencies. That independence, of course, can be abused,
and therein lies the problem. Unfortunately it can be abused and it is of-
ten abused. As to what extent disclosure can serve as a mechanism for
preventing boards of directors from abusing the authority that they have
[Vol. 48:7
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and the power they have, that is a subject for securities lawyers, and I
won't try to take it on in this forum at this time.
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